mw 


Analytical  Parallel  and  Criticism 

ON  THE  PRINCIPAL 

UNION  AND  REBEL  GENERALS 


WHO  HAVE  HELD 


COMMANDS-IK-CHIEF  OF  ARMIES* 


The  recent  editorial  in  the  Journal,  entitled  “Military 
“ Talent  in  the  War,”  from  the  hasty  glance  which  its  brief 
space  compelled  it  to  give  to  the  prominent  soldiers  between 
whom  it  instituted  comparisons,  suggests  some  points  upon 
the  same  subject  which  deserve  more  careful  elaboration. 
That  article,  of  course,  was  confined  to  points  of  similarity 
between  the  individuals  selected  for  comparison;  but  it  is 
evident  there  are  points  of  discrepancy , which  might  be 
educed  between  the  same  individuals,  and  which  must  be 
presented,  in  anything  pretending  to  be  an  analysis  of  the 
characteristics  of  the  Northern  and  Southern  Generals. 
For  example : 

With  all  due  deference  to  the  experience  of  the  author  of 
that  article,  we  would  submit  the  following  criticisms  upon 
it,  as  questions  to  be  decided  by  the  judgments  of  reflecting 
readers.  Is  the  comparison  or  parallel  between  Lee  and 
Grant  borne  out  by  their  records  ? The  former  would  ap- 
pear to  be  as  cattlicus  as  the  latter  is  incautious,  i.  e.,  head- 
long, bold  ; the  former  as  tenacious,  in  the  offensive-defen- 
sive sense  of  pcrtinax,  as  the  latter  is  pertinacious  in  the 
pure  aggressive.  Lee  may  be  compared  to  the  Arch-Duke 
Charles,  of  whom  we  have  the  following  testimony  from 
his  opponent  Napoleon  Bonaparte  : “ Prince  Charles  is 
a man  whose  conduct  can  never  attract  blame.”  Grant  on  the 
other  hand  presents  a combination  of  the  peculiaiities  of 
Suwarrgw,  Blucber,  Peltssier,  and  kindred  spirits, 
whose  indomitable  perseveiance,  whose  Forwards!  For- 
wards!  fed  the  fire  of  resistance  with  fresh  columns  of 
headlong  attack,  until  its  violence  was  quenched  in  blood 
and  extinguished  beneath  the  feet  of  charging  life:  witness 
the  Spring  campaign  of  1864.f  Had  Grant  lived  at  an 
earlier  date,  he  might  have  been  assigned  to  that  class  of 
Commanders-in-C'hief — Attila,  Genghis-Khan,  Tamour- 
LANE,j:  and  other  Eastern  conquerors — vho  expedited  mas- 
sive columns,  with  resistless  fury,  upon  awaiting  entrench- 
ments, squares  and  lines,  and  overran  or  overwhelmed 
nations; — dismissing  tens  of  thousands  to  the  onset,  with  a 
suggestive  and  imperative  motion  of  command  ; leaving  to 
subordinate  ability  and  vigor,  courage  and  discipline,  to 
meet  and  piovide  against  the  details  of  accomplishment: 
somewhat  as  Napoleon  by  a wave  of  the  arm  hurled 


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forward  an  important  attack  at  Eylau,  or  Suwarrow,  by  a 
laconic  order,  indicated  the  onsets  and  manoeuvres  of  Novi , 
1799: — “Kray  and  Bellegarde  will  attack  the  left,  the 
Russians  the  centre,  Melas  the  right !”  “ God  wills,  the 

“ Emperor  orders,  Suwarrow  commands  that  to-morrow  the 
“ enemy  be  conquered.” 

Taking  Napoleon  at  his  own  estimate  of  himself,  as  ex- 
pressed in  his  own  analysis  of  his  own  tactics,  many  ad- 
mirers of  Grant  would  not  be  willing  to  accept  a com- 
parison to  him  as  a compliment.  “ It  is  always  the  most 
“ obstinate  general,  and  the  one  who  can  stand  a larger  ex- 
“ penditure  or  more  profuse  waste  of  men  who  gains  a 
“ battle.”  (Montgalliard  viii,  203).  What  a contrast 
does  this  confession  present  to  the  principle  of  Turenne, 
“ to  economize  the  blood  of  the  soldier  ?”  This  last  was  like- 
wise  Vauban’s  cherished  sentiment;  lavish  brain  work, 
economize  life  ! and  what  is  the  result  ? Turenne,  ac- 
cording to  Napoleon’s  own  admission,  was  the  only  General 
who  grew  greater  and  greater  by  experience  as  long  as  he 
lived,  greatest,  most  admired,  honoied  by  friend  and  oppo- 
nent, universally  lamented  when  he  fell.  The  same  as 
regards  Vauban.  Whereas  Napoleon  was  never  so  great 
as  at  his  rising.  In  the  earlier  stages  of  his  career  he  tri- 
umphed by  address,  afterwards  by  numbers ; at  first  by 
consummate  skill,  at  last  by  profuse  waste  of  blood  and 
overpowering  force,  annealed  into  mass  by  iron  discipline.^ 
The  Nomades  of  Asia  have  produced  Napoleons ; witness 
Attila,  Genghis-Khan,  Tamourlane;  yes,  the  barbarian 
races  of  Africa,  for  example,  Xingha-Bandi,  Mosele- 
katse,  whom  Moffat  in  his  South  Africa  styles  “ the 
“ Napoleon  of  the  Desert.”  Where,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  such  men  as  Gustavus,  Turenne,  Yauban,  Cohorn, 
Washington,  Wellington,  arisen  but  in  the  bosom  of  the 
highest,  i.  e.,  purest  phase  of  civilization.  To  this  latter 
class  we  must  hope  that  Sherman  belongs,  whose  iron  will 
is  subordinate  to  mature  judgment. 

The  French  author  of  the  “ Battle  of  Mont  St.  Jean,”  says 
that  “ Bonaparte  now  contemplated  with  a look  of  ferocity 
“ the  hideous  spectacle  of  so  frightful  a butchery.  The 
“ more  the  obstacles  to  his  success  multiplied,  the  more  ob- 
“ stinate  he  became.  He  was  indignant  at  these  unforseen 
“ difficulties,  and  far  from  hesitating  to  expose  and  to 
“ annihilate  an  army  whose  confidence  in  him  knew  no 
“"bounds,  he  ceased  not  to  send  forward  fresh  troops,  and  to 
“ order  them  to  charge  with  the  bayonet,  and  to  carry 
“ everything  before  them.  He  was  often  told  that  at 
“ various  points  the  affair  was  against  him,  and  that  his 
“ troops  began  to  waver,  “Forward  ! forward !”  was  his 
only  reply. 

A General  sent  to  inform  him  that  he  found  himself  in  a 
position  which  he  could  not  maintain,  owing  to  the  dread- 
ful fire  of  a battery,  and  to  ask  what  he  should  do. 

“ Let  him  carry  the  battery ,”  was  the  reply,  and  Napoleon 
abruptly  turned  his  back  on  the  Aide-de-Camp. 

As  regards  character,  or  extreme  manliness,  or  mag- 
nanimity of  views, ||  Grant  will  always  rank  A 1 ; and 
equally  as  a commander  of  men,  A 1 ; but  as  a consummate 
or  finished  General,  as  a military  genius,  have  his  antece- 
dents shown  that  he  can  claim  a higher  grade  than  several 
others  who  havemanifested  themselves  during  this  rebellion  ? 


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Grant  and  his  policy  recall  Philip  II  and  his  adage, 
“Time  and  I against  any  other  two.”  Were  not  the 
movements  to  flank  Lee,  in  the  spring  of  1864,  a repetition 
of  Hooker’s  idea  of  the  preceding  year,  more  successful 
because  carried  out  with  the  superior  prestige  and  power, 
moral  and  material,  possessed  by  a generally  popular,  a 
successful,  and  a trusted  supreme  chief. 

It  is  very  disagreeable  to  cite  rebels  in  respect  to  ability, 
but  A.  Sidney  Johnston,  of  Utah  notoriety,  who  fell  at  Shiloh 
or  Pittsburg  Landing,  promised  a great  future,  as  did  also 
our  Smith,  who  died  about  the  same  time,  Reynolds,  the 
hero  and  victim  of  Gettysburg.  Stonewall  Jackson 
captivated  the  fancy,  but  he  was  not  a great  General, 
properly  speaking,  although  his  death  was  Providential  for 
us,  since  his  life  fired  the  Southern  heart.  His  fall  was 
almost  a compensation  for  the  failure  of  Chancellorsville. 
In  many  respects  Stonewall  Jackson  and  Grant  are  not 
so  very  dissimilar.  Just  analyze  both  characters  and  decide 
if  this  remark  is  any  disparagement  of  our  Lieutenant- 
General. 

Thomas,  victor  of  the  great  battle  at  Nashville,  is  a solid 
chaiacter,  grand  in  its  solidity.  He  reminds  a military 
reader  of  the  spotless  Macdonald,  not  brilliant  but  always 
reliable,  whether  charging  through  the  “ tourmente ” churm 
of  the  Splugen,  or  the  chaos  and  crash  of  the  Austrian  bat- 
teries at  Wagram,  a spectacle  worthy  of  consideration, 
either  when  ordering  his  drums  to  beat  the  charge  in  order 
to  encourage  his  men  to  dare  confront  the  Avalanches  of 
the  Lepontian  (Grison)  Alps  in  1800,  or  when  ordering  his 
own  conduct  as  an  example  where  his  column  had  to  tri- 
umph or  die,  on  the  plain  of  the  Marchfeld,  in  1 809. 

“ O,  paint  the  hero,  who  from  rank  to  rank 
Impetuous  flies,  ’mid  death’s  career,  at  which 
Bellona  even  stands  appall’d,  to  stem 
The  current  of  the  Rebel  arms,  and  rear 
The  impenetrable  rock  of  granite  firm 
In  stately  mass  of  immobilitj*. 

Describe  the  brazen  thundering  cannon’s  mouth, 
Discharging  flames  of  vivid  fire  around.” 


Lee  is  rather  a Fabius  than  a Marcellus,  or  perhaps  a 
union  of  the  best  qualities  of  both,  showing  different 
phases  of  energy,  as  a revolving  light  flashes  forth  different 
colors  of  brilliancy  as  it  slowly  makes  its  revolutions  before 
watching  eyes,  amid  the  tempest.  Grant  has  littld  or 
nothing  of  the  delaying  talent  of  Fabius  Cunctator,  except 
perseverance,  a quality  which  was  not  confined  to  the 
Roman  Dictator. 

To  pass  on  to  the  next  couplet  of  the  editorial  parallel  in 
question.  Do  Joe  Johnston  and  McClellan  resemble 
each  other  in  the  attributes  which  distinguish  them  ? The 
former  was  by  no  means  a popular  commander  while  in 
actual  command , whereas  the  latter,  like  the  noted  Marquis 
of  Granby,  was  particularly  so.  Joe  Johnston  was  a 
quick,  skillful,  and  hard  hitter,  eminently  cognizant  of  the 
value  of  time,  of  place,  and  of  circumstance, — witness  his 
opportune  appearance,  to  our  discomfiture,  at  the  first  Bull 
Run  : McClellan  was  sadly  deficient  in  a due  appreciation 
of  all  of  these  three,  and  particularly  in  the  combination 
of  the  whole  three.  That  “ Time  is  a hard  horse  to  beat,” 
he  especially  ignored.  He  reminds  a person  of  Athel- 


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stan,  “ the  Unready,"  in  his  tardiness,  being  always  behind 
the  time,  however  wise  the  intent  and  plan ; while  he  does 
not  recall  the  Saxon  prince  in  his  willingness  to  adventure 
his  cloth  cap  and  jerkin  against  the  steel  head  piece  and 
armor  of  the  Templar.  McClellan  always  demanded 
very  great  and  favorable  odds,  Joe  Johnston  was  willing 
to  supply  odds  by  augmented  vigor. 

In  fine,  Joe  Johnston  resembles  the  Great  Frederick  at 
the  epoch  of  the  Second  Silesian  war ; McClellan  the 
Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine  of  that  era.  Opposed  to 
the  Prince,  when  manipulated  and  directed  by  old  Marshal 
Traun  (to  whom  Frederick  admitted  he  “went  to  school,” 
a general  very  much  of  the  same  stamp  as  our  Sherman). 
Frederick,  driven  back  slowly  but  surely  in  the  same 
manner  as  Joe  Johnston  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  or 
retreat,  lost  prestige  and  vantage;  against  a Prince 
Charles  alone,  the  Confederate  chief  acquired  glory  and 
achieved  victory  as  in  the  Virginian  Peninsular. 

The  third  parallel  is  Hooker  and  Hood.  Is  there  any 
similitude  between  these,  except  that  both  are  bold  and  en- 
terprising commanders  ? In  genius  Hooker^  towers  above 
Hood  as  far  as  one  general,  i.  e.,  a manoeuvring  or  expert 
general,  can  tower  above  another.  The  plan  of  Chancel- 
lorsville  was  a master  conception.  It  yet  remains  to  be 
explained  why  it  failed.  “ Sooner  or  later,”  says  Mon- 
tesquieu, “ all  will  be  made  known.”  To  Hooker,  as  a 
general,  may  be  applied  in  another  sense  the  idea  that  he  is 
“ monarch  of  all  he  surveys .”  His  coup  d'oeil  is  magnificent. 
His  plan  of  operations  in  regard  to  battle,  which  occurred 
at  Gettysburg,  was  excellent,  and  if  carried  out  as  he  in- 
tended, would  have  ground  Lee  to  pieces  between  an  upper 
and  nether  millstone.  His  military  calibre  may  be  best 
explained  by  a comparison : He  cannot  play  chess  blindfold. 
Any  battle-field  within  the  scope  of  vision,  he  is  capable  of 
governing,  but  the  question  is,  can  he,  by  telegraph  or 
orders,  direct  vast  and  difficult  combinations  beyond  the 
range  of  vision.  Lookout  is  a triumph,  glorious  enough 
for  a general  to  repose  upon.  Admirably  planned,  it  was 
executed  as  boldly.  Hood,  on  the  other  hand,  is  simply  a 
bold  and  reckless  fighter.  If  it  is  not  considered  a reflec- 
tion, and  no  offence  or  depreciation  is  intended  our 
Lieutenant-General,  the  parallel  between  Hood’s  and 
Grant’s  tactics  is  closer  than  many  would  like  to  avow 
were  the  touchstone  of  analytical  criticism  applied,  cceteris 
paribus,  to  both. 

As  to  Sherman,  there  can  be  no  disagreement.  He  is  a 
great  general,  the  greatest  this  war  has  produced,  the 
greatest,  taking  the  word  general  in  its  true  signification, 
this  country  has  ever  been  blessed  with.  Like  all  trans- 
cendant  generals,  he  is  as  able  with  his  tongue  and  his  pen,  as 
he  is  as  a military  leader,  as  an  administrator,  as  a master 
of  logistics,  strategy  and  tactics.  The  world  acknowledges 
this  But  the  glory  is  to  have  perceived  it  when  the  world 
did  not  comprehend  it,  at  the  outset  of  his  career,  when  the 
wiseacres  at  the  metropolis  of  mediocrity  pronounced  him 
“ crazy.”  Their  verdict  reminds  us  of  the  judgment  passed 
on  the  immortal  Wolfe,  whose  selection  to  command  the 
expedition  destined  against  Quebec,  induced  the  represen- 
tation to  Prime  Minister  Pitt  that  he  (Wolfe)  was  mad. 
The  great  statesman’s  reply  is  variously  reported,  but  the 


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sense  of  all  his  answers  is  the  same.  “ If  he  is  mad,  I 
“wish  he  would  bite  all  the  rest  of  the  army,”  or  “ I wish 
“ there  were  hundreds  more  of  just  such  mad*men  in  the 
“ British  army.” 

Finally,  the  British  military  critics  couple  the  name  of 
another  general  with,  although  subordinate  to,  that  of 
Sherman — Rosecrans.**  He  has  shown  that  he  possesses 
the  attributes  of  a great  strategist.  Jealousy,  or  some 
other  equally  potent  cause,  has  enveloped  his  glory  with 
the  mists  of  prejudice.  But  his  campaign  from  Nashville 
to  Chattanooga  can  never  be  forgotten  by  true  military 
observation.  His  ability  will  yet  emerge  from  the  cloud 
which  invests  it,  and  its  brilliancy  be  acknowledged  by  an 
appreciating  people. 

Sherman  is  the  American  Frederic  the  Great  (Napo- 
leon, if  the  word  imply  more),  Hannibal,  and  Sertorius 
(“the  greatest  general,”  says  the  “tactician,”  “prophet,” 
Yon  Bulow,  “of  antiquity” — the  greatest  general  for 
mountain  warfare,  it  is  admitted,  that  the  world  has  ever 
seen),  the  hero  of  the  war,  the  solver  of  the  problem,  and 
the  cynosure  of  military  admiration.  The  North  can  never 
be  sufficiently  grateful  for  him  ; for,  as  Decker  truly  says, 
“ a great  captain  is  the  chiefest  gift  of  Providence  to  a na- 
“ tion.” 

“ Dieu  des  combats,  sois-lui  toujours  fidele  ! 

Dieu  de  la  paix,  couronne  ce  guerrier ! 

A son  genie  appartient  l’immortelle, 

A sa  valeur  appartient  le  laurier.” 

O God  of  battles,  shield  him  with  thy  power ! 

O God  of  peace,  his  warrior  temples  crown ! 

Due  to  his  genius  the  “ immortal”  flower, 

The  laurel  has  his  valor  made  his  own. 

There  has  been  no  combined  seriatim  manoeuvring,  prop- 
erly speaking,  in  this  wTar,  except  by  Rosecrans  and  Sher- 
man. J.  Watts  de  Peyster. 

February  12,  1865. 


NOTES. 

* The  following  remarks  are  printed  verbatim,  as  written 
in  order  that  it  may  not  be  charged  that  they  were  made 
subsequent  to  operations,  which  might  have  occasioned 
changes  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  generals  cited,  or  have 
induced  the  writer  to  suppress  or  alter  or  color  his  criti- 
cisms in  accordance  with  facts,  circumstances,  interest  or 
the  times.  If  they  are  just,  let  them  stand  as  a proof  of 
clear  and  honest  judgment ; if  unjust,  they  will  fall  to  the 
ground  as  errors,  not  intentional  mistakes,  but  errors  in 
judgment,  dictated  by  no  feeling  against  any  one  named  on 
the  loyal  side. 

t Grant,  according  to  the  analysis  of  one  of  the  best  dis- 
sectors of  character,  Grant  is  no  strategist — as  the  term  is 
generally  used — but  a Thor -striker,  whose  road  to  his  ob- 
ject is  corduroyed  with  dead  men. 

^Bajazet,  at  Angora,  Friday,  20th  or  28th  July,  1402» 
although  at  the  head  of  120,000  Osmans,  placed  his  main 
reliance  in  his  30,000  janizaries,  infantry,  whom,  con- 


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stituting  his  main  centre,  marshalled  in  a vast  parallelo- 
gram, he  commanded  in  person,  on  foot,  in  their  midst. 

Tamerlane  led  840,000  Mongols  and  auxiliaries,  prin- 
cipally cavalry,  whose  charges,  headed  by  his  brave  sons  and 
grandsons,  wore  out  the  whole  summer  day  without  de- 
ciding the  conflict.  Finally,  the  lame  Khan,  having 
launched  in  vain  10,000  after  10,000  cuirassiers,  as  well  as 
light  armed  horsemen  against  the  Turks,  signalled  50,000 
— some  say  100,000  horse — his  grand  reserve  and  chosen 
column,  to  make  a decisive  effort.  It  was  successful  ; and 
on  a field  strewn  with  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dead  and 
wounded,  the  vast  majority  Tartars,  Timour  received  the 
tokens  of  victory,  and  welcomed  to  the  shelter  of  his  tents  his 
illustrious  captives,  among  them  his  rival  and  late  haughty 
antagonist  and  his  son  Musa,  besides  several  emirs  and 
officers  of  the  highest  distinction.  (Savage’s  Turkish 
History  : New  York  Historical  Society,  144-6.  Lamar- 
tine’s La  Turquie.  Yon  Kausler’s  “ Memorable  Bat- 
“ ties,  Combats  and  Sieges,” — pp  145-6,  plate  1-3. 

§ But  we  must  pass  over  in  silence  the  Spanish  wars,  and 
the  times  subsequent  to  them,  or,  at  least,  only  speak  of 
them  to  bring  up  the  faults  committed,  and  to  prove  that 
Fortune  must  have  abandoned  Napoleon  the  day  he  be- 
came unfaithful,  in  carrying  on  military  operations,  to  the 
true  principles  of  war,  which  hitherto  he  had  respected.  The 
accumulation  of  men  and  mean^  were  useless  to  date  from 
those  epochs  of  unhappy  memory,  and,  with  the  exception 
of  Lutzen  and  Bautzen,  (to  which  the  translator  excepts 
again),  we  cannot  recognize  Napoleon  in  any  of  his  cam- 
paigns. (Maumont’s  “ Military  Institutions,”  120.) 

||  Had  the  writer  read  the  Lieutenant-General’s  Report 
before  this  was  published,  he  would  have  been  more 
restricted  in  regard  to  the  magnanimity,  without  adding  a 
word  as  to  the  ability,  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Grant 
should  have  been  more  considerate  in  regard  to  others,  par- 
ticularly Rosecrans,  whose  laurels  are  laurels  indeed, 
whereas  the  coronal  which  encircles  his  own  brows  should 
be  composed  not  of  laurels  (or  at  best  of  laurels  alone),  but 
of  asphodels. 

^[Marmont,  in  his  “Military  Institutions,”  avers  that, 
with  10,000  men  a general  fights  ; that  he  should  be  in  the 
midst  of  his  troops,  and  often  expose  himself  to  the  enemy’s 
fire.  [As  general  of  division,  especially  at  Willi amsburgh — 
by  many  considered  the  bloodiest  battle  of  the  whole  rebel- 
lion— Hooker  fulfilled  these  conditions.] 

A general,  continues  the  Duke  of  Ragusa,  commands 
30,000  men,  manoeuvres  his  troops  and  his  reserves,  and 
as  a rule,  with  the  exception  of  extraordinary  cases,  keeps 
out  of  musketry  (i.e.,  old-fashioned  musketry  fire  at  100 
yards)  but  is  under  artillery  fire  (cannon  range  in  Mar- 
mont’s  time  scarcely  exceeded  that  of  rifled  musketry  at  this 
epoch),  and  remains  within  range  of  round  shot.  [At  An- 
tiotam  and  Look-Out,  Hooker  again  nobly  performed  his 
duty  under  this  category  of  requirements.] 

A general,  concludes  the  French  Marshal,  directs  or 
supervises  100,000  men.  He  draws  up  the  plan,  issues  his 
orders  before  the  battle,  sets  the  ball  in  motion,  and  awaits 
the  event  in  a central  position.  [This  Hooker  did  at 
Chancellorsville,  and  his  strategical  preparations  cannot 


7 


well  be  found  fault  with.]  During  the  action  he  becomes 
a sort  of  Providence,  without  the  irresistible  power  to  cause 
his  orders,  however  indispensable  to  success,  and  even  the 
safety  of  his  troops,  to  be  executed,  he  meets  instantly  unex- 
pected contrarieties,  and  remedies  greater  accidents.  [Hook- 
er, stricken  down  and  senseless  for  hours,  at  the  moment  his 
generalship  was  most  needed,  could  not  enact  this  role.] 
He  should  expose  himself  before  the  battle  to  see  every- 
thing for  himself,  and  judge  with  precision  of  the  real 
state  of  affairs.  These  duties  performed,  he  gives  his  or- 
ders, and  leaves  to  each  subordinate  those  belonging  to  the 
part  assigned  to  him.  [Hooker  did  this  emphatically,  and 
subordinates  knocked  his  grand  conception,  by  non- execu- 
tion thereof,  into  pi.]  If  affairs  go  well,  he  has  nothing- 
more  to  do.  If  accidents  occur  he  should  avert  or  retrieve 
them  as  far  as  the  means  in  his  power  will  allow.  If  things 
are  very  bad,  and  a catastrophe  is  to  be  feared,  he  should 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  last  reserves,  and  head  them 
against  the  enemy,  and  his  presence  at  this  moment  of  su- 
preme importance  gives  them  an  impulse  and  a moral 
force  which  doubles  their  valor.  [At  Williamsburgh 
Hooker’s  pi  esence  held  his  men  up  against  fearful  odds, 
and  when  they  had  to  give  ground  they  gathered  around 
him  as  a centr  e and  strong  tower,  to  make  their  last  des- 
perate stand.  Throughout  the  Peninsular  campaign  it 
was  everywhere  and  always  the  same.  At  Bristow  Station 
Stonewall  Jackson  encountered  in  “fighting  Joe”  a 
moral  impulse  and  potential  fighting  power  equal  to  his  own, 
and  was  there  first  driven , as  he  had  been  wont  to  drive.  At 
Antietam  the  same  casualty  kept  Hooker’s  intrepidity  and 
uenius  from  transmitting  partial  into  complete  success,  and 
in  the  Georgia  campaign,  from  Lookout  to  Peach-Tree 
Creek,  Hooker  was  the  prominent  figure  in  the  triumph, 
splendid  in  the  brilliancy  of  his  effective  execution.] 

**  Taking  the  word  General  ( strategos ) in  its  closest 
and  highest  stm-e,  as  regards  strategical,  administrative 
and  supervisory  abilities,  Rosecrans  is  certainly  the  com- 
mander who  t omes  nearest  to  the  exemplification  of  the 
Greek  idea.  The  greatest  general  (strategos)  of  the  Ameri- 
can Kevolution,  either  on  the  Colonial  or  Royal  side,  was 
Greene.  As  a strategist  and  master  of  grand  tactics,  no 
other,  not  even  Washington  himself,  could  approach 
him. 

Rosecrans  is  the  Greene  of  this  war  ; but  even  as 
Greene  had  a thorn  in  his  side — a link,  very  small,  but 
still  a link  wanting — even  so  must  it  be  with  Rose- 
crans, or  else  he  would  have  stood  forth  as  the  Man , taking 
man  in  its  broadest  and  grandest  acceptation,  the  hero  of 
this  war.  He  had  all  the  cool  deliberation  of  Greene — the 
active  energy  of  Wayne — and  the  intelligent  pertinacity 
of  Schuyler  ; but — and  here  the  analysis  of  character  finds 
itself  baffled,  even  as  in  chemistry  or  any  other  science, 
the  detection  of  some  little  remote  cause  of  the  highest  im- 
portance, eludes  the  earnest  investigation  of  the  philoso- 
pher. Rosecrans  is  one  of  those  men  whom  a West  Point 
education  developes.  He  is  a striking  exception  to  that 
general  rule,  that  the  inevitable  result  of  routine  education 
is  to  choke  free  thought.  Witness  Davis  and  Lincoln. 
Rosecrans  issued  from  West  Point,  not  only  a mere  mas- 
ter of  battalion  tactics,  but  a chemist,  architect,  engineer, 


8 


miner,  natural  philosopher,  competent  to  grapple  with  the 
fine  exigencies  of  any  scientific  career,  and  develope  himself 
into  a practical  application  of  what  he  had  learned.  That 
is  to  say,  the  germ  of  his  education,  grew  through  his  reflec- 
tion and  experience  into  a plant  whose  magnitude  was  a 
proper  sequel  to  its  origin.  In  the  military  art  and  science 
he  is  not  only  a practical  soldier,  hut  an  organizing  origin- 
ator. Witness  the  system  of  inspections,  which,  admirable 
as  they  are,  were  based  on  his  original  orders.  He  certainly 
possesses  the  most  comprehensive  intelleot  of  any  general 
the  writer  has  enco  unted  in  society.  Able  to  converse  on 
military  topics  with  a soldier,  surveying  with  an  engineer, 
mineralogy  with  a scientific  miner,  chemistry  with  an  edu- 
cated manufacturer  of  articles,  whose  productions  and 
profits  are  based  on  that  science,  trade  with  a merchant  of 
high  standing  and  close  observation.  The  list  of  his  capa- 
bilities might  be  enlarged,  but  sufficient  has  been  said  to 
prove  that  a West  Point  education  is  of  untold  practical 
value  even  to  a citizen,  provided  that  citizen  has  the  brain 
to  receive,  and  comprehend,  and  apply  the  instruction. 

But  to  return  to  Rosecrans’  military  record,  which  alone 
is  pertinent  to  this  occasion.  In  Western  Virginia  his 
plans  of  operations,  his  manipulation  of  his  troops,  his  com- 
prehension of  the  capabilities  and  assignment  of  men,  and 
his  command  are  faultless,  as  far  as  he  was  permitted  to 
act  independently,  and  was  not  fettered  by  that  injustice 
which  from  the  first  prevented  the  Louvois  in  the  War  De- 
partment from  judging  dispassionately  of  the  merits  of  men, 
and,  by  blinding  his  judgment  with  his  prejudices,  pre- 
vented him  from  perceiving  that  he  was  sometimes  sacri- 
ficing the  interests  of  a great  people,  of  humanity  in  gross, 
his  own  personal  dislike  of  individuals,  and  his  use  of 
his  power  as  a public  officer,  to  gratify  an  inexplicable  ap- 
petite for  annoyance.  Witness  his  answer(l)  to  Rose- 
crans, when  the  latter  applied  to  him  for  reinforcements, 
in  July,  1863,  “ that  he  (Stanton)  would  be  damned  if  he 
“ would  give  him  (Rosecrans)  another  man.”  This  drew 
forth  the  remark  of  General  Rousseau,  that  “ he  was  satis- 
“ fied  that  my  (Rosecrans’)  official  destruction  was  but  a 
“ question  of  time  and  opportunity.  The  will  to  accom- 
“ plish  it  existed,  and  that  it  was  no  use  to  hope  for  any 
“ assistance  from  the  War  Department.” 

The  same  remarks  apply  as  justly  to  Rosecrans  whole 
subsequent  career,  for  the  same  causes  produced  like  re- 
suits  up  to  the  moment  he  was  relieved  from  command. 

Anchor. 

Tivoli,  December,  I860. 

(1)  Consult  Rosecrans’  Testimony  before  the  Joint  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  ; Report  142,  page  28,  Rosecrans’  Cam- 
paign. 


